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In almost every year since the end of 1940s, the volume of international trade has grown 
faster than the volume of world production and, as a result, the degree of interdependence of the 
world economy has increased. A large share of this rapid growth of international trade has been 
accomplished under the control of multinational corporations (MNCs) and a good proportion of MNCs’ 
imports and exports consists of intrafirm trade.  
 
Despite this increasingly important role of intrafirm trade in international commerce, this 
phenomenon has not attracted much investigation in academic community. The reasons are twofold.  
 
Firstly, intrafirm trade presents a substantial challenge to traditional trade theories. Most 
theorising on international trade assumes explicitly or implicitly that it is undertaken by unrelated 
buyers and sellers in world markets. However, motivation for the international exchange of goods on 
open markets may differ for transactions within the MNCs. While in the former decisions are relatively 
decentralised, in the latter they tend to be centralised - “hierarchical” transactions in (Williamson´s 
1975) terminology. Apparently we need a new and specific theoretical framework to grasp the 
phenomenon, not yet available. 
 
Secondly, data on intrafirm trade is scarce, and when it exists it is usually too aggregated.  
The United States (US) and Japan
1  are the only countries that systematically report on related party 
trade, but in the latter case data are too aggregated for the purposes of this paper. In the US case the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the US Department of Commerce reports annually on intrafirm 
trade but disaggregated data available for consultation are restricted to the majority-owned foreign 
affiliates (MOFAs). For other countries only rarely is it possible to get a figure for the importance of 
total intrafirm trade. 
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These shortcomings explain the few studies we have on this subject. Those available aim 
mainly to identify at an empirical level, and in spite of the data limitations, the possible sources of 
intrafirm trade
2. This paper belongs to this line of research. 
 
We aim to investigate the factors determining the intrafirm trade of US firms in the period 
1989-1998. We will extend previous similar econometric testing not only by using more recent data 
but also by considering inter-country differences in addition to inter-sectoral variation of intrafirm 
trade. Besides, among the factors considered we will also analyse the specific role of the 
concentration/proximity factors suggested by the Economic Geography theory. Our results will be 
conditioned by the high level of aggregation of our study (32 sectors and 34 countries), imposed by 
our data source. However, the panel nature of the data allows to partially overcome the reduced 
number of observations. 
 
The paper goes as follows: next section presents a brief description of intrafirm trade of US 
firms between 1989 and 1998. Section 3 makes a short revue of some contributions to the 
hypotheses to be tested; the models and the variables used are described in section 4; in section 5 
we present and discuss the results and finally we conclude in section 6. 
 
 
2. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
In what follows we use the information of the BEA of the US Department of Commerce to 
analyse the major trends of US intrafirm trade (IFT) for the period between 1989 and 1998. Data for 
1998 are preliminary. 
 
Table 1 presents statistics for the share of US intrafirm trade in the US trade. As we can 
observe, the intrafirm trade represents a weight close to 40 percent of total US trade in all years. 
From 1989 to 1998, intrafirm trade varied between 37 percent and 44.1 percent. This means that US 
foreign trade data are probably highly sensitive to variation in the transfer pricing of MNCs. This fact in  
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itself justifies a special attention to this phenomenon, as its implications involve not only the Balance 
of Payments but also tax revenue considerations. 
 
TABLE 1 
Share of US IFT in the Total US Trade (1989-1998) 
   1989 1990 1991  1992 1993 1994 1995  1996 1997 1998 
Exports  38.1% 36.5% 32.7%  33.4% 33.5% 36.5% 35.1%  35.5% 36.0% 35.4% 
Imports  48.7% 49.8% 43.1%  41.5% 39.8% 43.4% 41.6%  41.6% 39.8% 39.3% 
Total  44.1% 43.9% 38.3%  37.8% 37.0% 40.4% 38.8%  39.0% 38.1% 37.6% 
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce 
 
Since the value of this indicator varied very little in the period, we can assume that US 
intrafirm trade increased roughly at the same rate as the US trade. This is also true for the share of 
US intrafirm imports in the total of US imports and for the US intrafirm exports in the total of US 
exports. The indicator varied, in the latter case, between 32.7 and 38.1 percent (respectively, in 1991 
and 1989) and, in the former, between 39.3 percent (in 1998) and 49.8 percent (in 1990). 
 
We can divide this US intrafirm trade in two major categories: one that corresponds to IFT 
between US parent firms and their affiliates
3 in the rest of the World, and another relative to IFT 
between foreign parent firms and their affiliates
4 in the US (US affiliates, in what follows). There is, 
obviously, a third category that refers to the trade between US affiliates and foreign affiliates of the 
same group, but the BEA does not report these data.   
 
From Table 2 we can observe the average share of intrafirm trade in these two groups for the 
period analysed. For the total intrafirm trade the values are similar: 20.4 percent for trade between US 
parents and their foreign affiliates and 18.6 percent for trade between foreign firms and their US 
affiliates. But the nature of this trade is different. The intrafirm trade between US parents and their 
foreign affiliates is, essentially, intrafirm exports (on average, 25.3 percent of total US exports) while 





Share of US IFT in the Total US Trade reported between US Parents and US Affiliates from Foreign MNFs 
(1989-1998 average) 
  US Parents US Affiliates Total
Exports  25.3% 9.8% 35.1%
Imports  16.5% 25.5% 42.0%
Total  20.4% 18.6% 39.0%
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce 
 
Comparing intrafirm exports of US affiliates with the intrafirm imports of US parents, we can 
observe that this value is higher (almost the double) in the latter case. In order to understand this 
result, we have to take into consideration that US affiliates export to several markets, while US 
parents are importing into a single, large and well developed market  
 
The intrafirm trade statistics disaggregated by country are described in Tables 3 and 4. These 
tables report the US intrafirm trade in the total US trade but now at the bilateral level. This means that 
they describe the propensity of each US partner to trade through related parties instead of arms´ 
length. We analyse the case of the NAFTA members (Canada and Mexico), the European Union 
(EU), Brazil (the major developing economy with data available for all years) and Asia 5, that includes 
Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Thailand. 
 
TABLE 3 
Share of US Bilateral IFT in the Total US Bilateral Trade (1989-1998) 
   1989 1990 1991  1992 1993  1994 1995  1996 1997  1998
Brazil  23.2%22.7%21.8%  27.4%31.3%  31.0%27.4%  32.9%29.7%  30.8%
Canada  44.3%41.5%42.3%  41.8%39.8%  41.9%39.9%  39.4%39.5%  38.2%
Japan  70.9%75.6%75.0%  75.9%72.2%  80.4%78.2%  82.2%77.5%  75.6%
Mexico  25.1%25.5%28.2%  28.8%29.0%  32.0%30.9%  31.9%29.3%  28.2%
European Union  44.2%41.2%42.3%  44.1%45.3%  48.1%48.8%  48.4%49.3%  48.7%
Asia 5  20.1%21.1%21.3%  20.2%23.7%  26.2%26.3%  29.5%30.5%  33.3%
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce 
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Data show this propensity is higher in the Japanese case. The share of US intrafirm trade with 
Japan in the US bilateral trade with this country is, on average, 75.6 percent, reaching 82.2 percent in 
1996. The EU is second on this ranking, and presents a stabilised tendency in the end of the period, 
with around 48 % of total trade with US corresponding to intrafirm trade. Canada and Mexico have 
propensities of intrafirm trade around 40 and 30 percent, respectively, between 1989 and 1998. 
Considering that these countries have a free trade agreement with the US since 1994 (with the 
launching of NAFTA), we may conclude that NAFTA´s impact on the members’ intrafirm trade and on 
the members’ arms’ length trade was similar.  
 
 
In what concerns EU members, Sweden, German, Netherlands and United Kingdom (UK) 
display the highest shares of bilateral intrafirm trade in the bilateral US trade, with values higher that 
50 percent in almost all years. On the other hand, Portugal and Greece are the EU members with the 
TABLE 4 
Share of US/EU Countries Bilateral IFT in the Total Bilateral Trade (1989-1998) 
   1989  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995  1996 1997  1998
Austria  26.9% 40.1% 39.9% 34.9% 36.3% 36.7% 36.8%  46.7%36.2%  32.0%
Denmark  23.6% 20.2% 20.7% 23.8% 27.7% 22.6% 25.0%  27.5%26.5%  27.2%
Finland  16.3% 22.5% 22.8% 33.4% 27.3% 48.7% 50.1%  39.0%48.5%  51.8%
France  52.5% 49.0% 46.9% 50.0% 50.8% 59.3% 59.5%  55.3%47.4%  42.2%
Germany  55.0% 52.6% 52.3% 53.9% 57.7% 62.5% 61.8%  60.4%63.9%  61.0%
Greece  5.2% 3.4% 2.4% 2.1% 2.8% 2.5% 4.8%  3.0% 2.7% 2.2%
Ireland  43.4% 44.9% 43.6% 40.2% 34.9% 34.1% 41.3%  39.3%44.2%  54.4%
Italy  23.2% 19.9% 21.3% 21.3% 22.0% 26.4% 25.4%  25.3%26.9%  22.7%
Netherlands  48.2% 47.1% 51.5% 58.5% 62.3% 59.8% 59.9%  60.7%78.8%  93.3%
Portugal  6.4% 8.9% 7.4% 8.1% 9.6% 5.2% 9.4%  9.0%10.8%  10.4%
Spain  30.7% 16.3% 17.9% 17.6% 19.9% 19.8% 18.5%  21.3%20.8%  19.9%
Sweden  61.3% 61.3% 60.8% 65.6% 68.9% 77.6% 64.3%  63.2%73.7%  72.4%
United Kingdom  47.7% 45.2% 48.3% 48.5% 46.4% 49.8% 51.0%  49.9%45.5%  42.1%
Belgium+Luxemburg  30.1% 27.6% 28.1% 29.4% 28.6% 27.5% 28.0%  27.5%27.3%  29.0%
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce          
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lower shares of intrafirm trade with the US economy, with values never higher than 11 percent. The 
remaining members have stable and moderate values for their intrafirm trade. 
 
Next we analyse for the US partners signalled in the previous two tables, the weight of 
bilateral intrafirm trade in the total US intrafirm trade (Tables 5 and 6).  
 
We can observe in Table 5 that for all years, but the last one, Japan was the major US 
intrafirm trade partner, even if, during the period analysed, the relative importance of this country 
decreased. Canada is second on this ranking. Between 1989 and 1998, the share of this country on 
total US intrafirm trade varied between 21.4 and 22.9 percent, displaying a clear stable tendency. For 
the other NAFTA member (Mexico), the share on US intrafirm trade is much lower, with values 
between 4.1 (in 1989) and 8.1 percent (in 1998), even if in this case there is a clear increasing trend. 
 
TABLE 5 
IFT by Country in the Total US IFT (1989-1998) 
   1989  1990 1991  1992 1993  1994 1995  1996 1997 1998
Brazil   1.0% 0.9% 0.8% 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3%
Canada   22.9%  21.4%21.4%  21.4%21.7%  21.4%21.0%  20.7%21.2%  21.0%
Japan   30.5%  30.9%30.1%  29.8%29.0%  29.2%28.6%  27.2%24.4%  22.6%
Mexico   4.1% 4.4% 5.2% 5.9% 6.1% 6.8% 6.5% 7.6% 7.7% 8.1%
European Union  23.6%  23.1%23.0%  23.5%22.9%  21.6%24.2%  23.7%24.8%  26.4%
Asia 5  6.7% 6.8% 7.0% 6.7% 7.9% 8.1% 8.9% 9.4% 9.5% 9.3%
Other Countries  10.2%  12.5%12.5%  11.7%11.3%  11.8% 9.7%  10.1%11.1%  11.3%
Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
EU is, undoubtedly in the end of the period, the first major US intrafirm trade partner. The 
weight of this group of countries in the total US intrafirm trade is relatively stable until 1995, but starts 





IFT by EU Countries in the Total US IFT (1989-1998) 
   1989 1990 1991 1992  1993 1994  1995 1996 1997  1998
Austria   0.17% 0.26% 0.27% 0.24% 0.26% 0.24% 0.28% 0.36% 0.27% 0.25%
Denmark   0.19% 0.18% 0.19% 0.20% 0.20% 0.16% 0.17% 0.19% 0.17% 0.19%
Finland   0.12% 0.16% 0.13% 0.18% 0.17% 0.29% 0.34% 0.34% 0.34% 0.39%
France   4.02% 3.87% 3.87% 3.97% 3.74% 3.78% 3.64% 3.31% 2.92% 2.94%
Germany  7.14% 7.27% 7.13% 7.28% 7.09% 6.70% 7.11% 6.82% 7.26% 7.78%
Greece   0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
Ireland   0.55% 0.57% 0.58% 0.56% 0.47% 0.45% 0.66% 0.60% 0.78% 1.27%
Italy   1.38% 1.22% 1.24% 1.21% 1.12% 1.22% 1.25% 1.24% 1.28% 1.13%
Netherlands   2.43% 2.50% 2.71% 3.01% 2.95% 2.47% 2.68% 2.55% 3.60% 4.13%
Portugal   0.03% 0.05% 0.03% 0.04% 0.04% 0.02% 0.04% 0.03% 0.04% 0.04%
Spain   0.78% 0.41% 0.43% 0.41% 0.37% 0.34% 0.34% 0.38% 0.35% 0.34%
Sweden   1.53% 1.51% 1.37% 1.34% 1.23% 1.23% 1.17% 1.21% 1.32% 1.41%
United Kingdom   5.80% 5.84% 5.62% 5.61% 5.78% 5.44% 5.53% 5.41% 5.29% 5.19%
Belgium + Luxemburg  1.24% 1.22% 1.20% 1.17% 1.10% 1.03% 1.04% 0.98% 1.02% 1.13%
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
In Table 6 we observe that Germany, United Kingdom, France and Netherlands dominate EU 
intrafirm trade with the US. These four countries are responsible for almost 75 percent of total 
intrafirm trade between EU and US in all years and represent about 30 percent of total US intrafirm 
trade. As noted above, Portugal and Greece have poor intrafirm trade shares, with less than 0.1 
percent of total US intrafirm trade. We can also identify a third group of EU countries with moderate 
intrafirm trade shares that includes Spain, Sweden, Ireland, Italy and Belgium plus Luxembourg.  
 
For all EU countries the values reported in Table 6 are relatively stable during the period 
analysed except for Netherlands and Ireland, which display a significant increase. In the Irish case, 




The remaining table allows us to have a sectoral picture of the phenomenon. Table 7 shows 
the shares of sectoral intrafirm trade in the total US intrafirm trade in the period analysed. The most 
important remark is that about 50 percent of the US intrafirm trade occur in the manufacturing 
industry. On this respect, transportation equipment had the largest share (17.5 percent, on average) 
denoting the role of the automobile producers on multinational activities and, as a consequence, in 
related parties trade. Machinery and electric and electronic equipment also have substantial shares of 
US intrafirm trade. 
 
TABLE 7 
Share of Industry IFT in the Total US IFT (1989-1998) 
   1989  1990 1991 1992  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997  1998
Petroleum   5.4%  7.0% 6.6% 5.5%  4.8% 5.2% 4.7% 4.7% 4.7%  4.7%
Manufacturing   47.8% 46.7% 47.9% 48.9% 48.9% 51.1% 52.6% 53.7% 57.0% 57.7%
Food and kindred products   1.2%  1.2% 1.3% 1.4%  1.5% 1.4% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1%  1.3%
Chemicals and allied products   5.6%  5.5% 5.8% 6.1%  5.9% 6.1% 6.3% 6.4% 4.3%  4.4%
Primary and fabricated metals   2.1%  1.7% 1.7% 1.9%  1.8% 1.9% 2.0% 1.9% 2.1%  2.0%
Machinery, except electrical   8.6%  9.1% 9.4% 8.8%  8.7% 8.9% 9.7% 10.1% 13.3% 13.1%
Electric and electr. equipment   6.8%  7.4% 7.7% 8.3%  8.3% 9.1% 9.5% 10.1% 7.8%  7.9%
Transportation equipment   18.5% 16.5% 16.4% 16.6% 17.1% 18.3% 18.4% 18.5% 19.0% 16.0%
Other manufacturing   5.2%  5.4% 5.6% 5.7%  5.5% 5.3% 5.5% 5.5% 9.8% 13.4%
Wholesale trade   45.4% 45.0% 44.1% 44.0% 44.9% 42.3% 41.4% 40.1% 37.5% 36.8%
Services   1.4%  1.3% 1.4% 1.6%  1.4% 1.4% 1.3% 1.5% 1.4%  0.8%
Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
US wholesale intrafirm trade also represents a large share of US intrafirm trade (42 percent, 
on average), indicating that a substantial part of US intrafirm trade is on final goods.  
 
In our empirical modeling we will resort to the database of this section but with a restriction. 
We will use only information relative to the intrafirm trade between US parents and their majority-
owned foreign affiliates (MOFAs
5). This means that we are excluding trade between foreign MNCs 
and their US affiliates, i.e., around 50 % of total US intrafirm trade and 20 % of total US trade. The  
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reason to confine our analysis to these data is the more detailed information we can get, 
indispensable to our modelling (like in the case of research and development and taxes paid by the 
affiliates). Tables 3 to 7 were rebuilt for this reduced sample
6. Comparison of the intrafirm values we 
get when we limit our analysis to MOFAs with the previous ones, suggests some noteworthy remarks. 
 
 First, in what concerns the share of the US bilateral intrafirm trade in the total US bilateral 
trade, the main alteration is the downfall of the prevalent role of Japan (a drop from more that 70 % to 
values never higher that 10%). This means that in the case of this country, intrafirm trade with the US 
is mainly due to the activity of US affiliates of Japanese MNCs, the US parents bearing a small role. In 
the case of the EU, US parents and US affiliates shares are similar on average. There are remarkable 
reductions in the values of bilateral IFT with the US in the cases of Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, pointing out to the relevant role of US 
affiliates on the intrafirm trade of these countries.  
 
 Second, analysis of the weight of intrafirm trade by country in the total US intrafirm trade for 
MOFAs confirms the particular case of Japan, which displays very small values for MOFAs, but is 
among the most important US partners when US affiliates are also considered. 
 
 Third, when we take into consideration sectoral information for MOFAs, the weight of the 
manufacturing industry in the total US intrafirm trade increases, from an average value of 50 % to 
around 70 %. The reason is the fact that, by considering MOFAs only, we are excluding the intrafirm 
trade between foreign parent firms and their affiliates in a developed economy (the US), precisely a 
type of intrafirm trade that we expect to include a substantial amount of wholesale intrafirm trade. 
 
 
3. THEORETICAL GUIDELINES 
 
 
In order to understand the motivations for intrafirm trade it is necessary to consider the 
reasons for vertical and horizontal integration across international boundaries. What leads a MNC to  
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buy inputs and finished goods within the international corporate structure instead of acquiring them 
through the market? And why should purchases be done abroad and not to the national economy?  
 
We do not dispose of formalised modelling that embodies in a systematic way the two 
aspects. However, it is possible to find relevant contributions in some conventional economic 
frameworks. 
 
The literature on MNCs postulates that the expansion of firms abroad occurs in response to 
certain “monopolistic advantages” which allow quasi-rents such as scale economies, product 
differentiation, skills of various sorts, access to capital, advanced technology, and so on. The fact that 
internalisation is preferred to open market sales of these advantages has been taken to reflect 
imperfections in what may broadly be labelled “information markets” – (Hymer, 1960), and (Arrow, 
1974). These imperfections are “market failures” which raise the cost of transacting open market 
sales, because of the difficulties inherent in fully appropriating the gains from the possession of 
superior “information” in open markets. Internalisation can also be analysed in the context of the 
transaction costs theory (Coase, 1937), in the sense that it is a matter of comparing the marginal cost 
associated to transacting through the open market with the marginal cost of the internalised trade.  
 
Internalisation in the sense we have described offers unquestionably a good reason for 
investing abroad, but what we aim to explain is why trade is internalised. (Lall, 1978) suggests that 
the choice of a MNC to resort to intrafirm trade may also be viewed as a response to a market failure 
in commodity markets which renders recourse to external transactions either impossible or relatively 
costly. If failure in commodity markets involves commodities which embody new information (i.e., they 
are produced with superior technology), the reasons for investing abroad (technological superiority) 
will be similar to the reasons for intrafirm trade (highly specific products not available on open 
markets). 
 
Another relevant theoretical body of analysis to our subject is the theory of vertical integration. 
Vertical integration is basically a matter of internalisation, when the latter occurs between different 
stages of the value-added chain. It is possible, however, to stipulate the following basic distinction.  
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While the internalisation of trade by MNCs refers to the choice between external and internal markets 
of firms that are already under common ownership and control, vertical integration can be seen as the 




Both theories provide a number of plausible reasons for the fact that a firm may prefer to rely 
on affiliates for their transactions. All sources of quasi-rents like scale economies, advertising 
expenditures or technological intensity, should stimulate intrafirm trade. As a particular case of quasi-
rent, (Lall, 1978) mentions the specificity of the product, in the sense of the “uniqueness” of high-
technology products made by the MNC, not available in open markets. Uncertainty, like political 
instability, price changes, variation on quality of the inputs, may either impact positively or negatively, 
depending on whether it is associated to domestic conditions or external ones. For instance, factors 
deferring repatriation of foreign profits may constitute a disincentive to related parties’ trade. 
 
Intrafirm trade is, however, also a matter of location. In fact, the issue is what leads a MNC to 
locate its related party in a foreign country instead of resorting to domestic trade, whether intrafirm or 
market trade. Several reasons have been offered on this respect but with an ad hoc nature. Some of 
these factors are systematised by (Cho, 1988) in a kind of eclectic approach, which incorporates 
product, region, government and firm-specific factors. Among them, transfer pricing should be 
underlined. It has been recognised, for example, that firms may employ transfer-pricing techniques in 
order to maximize their after-tax earnings. In (Horst, 1973), the firm chooses either the lowest or the 
highest transfer price possible depending on a comparison of the relative differential in tax rate on 
profits between the importing and the exporting countries with the tariff rate, and (Eden, 1998) has 
shown that such transfer pricing can affect intrafirm trade. In any case one should expect a country’s 
tax rate on profits to have influence on the magnitude of intrafirm trade flows and it is well known that 
one method for shifting profits between countries is to underprice goods sold to high tax countries and 
overprice goods sold in low tax countries. Such a strategy should imply that intrafirm trade flows to 
(from) high tax countries affiliates is low (high) relative to intrafirm trade flows to (from) low tax country 
affiliates. (Claussing, 1998) offered empirical evidence on this assumption for the US MNCs. 
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Intrafirm trade may also respond to exchange rate variations. Some authors argue that MNCs 
should be highly sensitive on this respect, due to superior international networks that allow 
informational advantages. By operating in different countries, they are able to alter sourcing and 
pricing decisions in response to exchange rate changes, insulating themselves from dramatic 
fluctuations. Cross-border investments and production facilities are thus likely to make fluctuations in 
exchange rates more tolerable for firms. 
 
The concept of international and spatial division of labour has also been associated to 
intrafirm trade. Multinational firms allocate different phases of the production process to different 
countries on the basis of region characteristics in terms of technology and knowledge. The pattern 
that usually occurs is high-tech and managerial tasks allocated to core regions, while labour intensive 
standardized and non-qualified activities are allocated to periphery, and trade occurs between 
different regions but internally to the firms. 
 
Finally, one should also consider factors suggested by the Economic Geography. It is 
possible that multinational firms, when searching for parents and/or foreign affiliates location, focus 
particularly on areas which their rivals have already explored and found satisfactory
8. The reason 
might be a combination of centrifugal and centripetal effects, in the lines of (Fujita et al, 1999). 
Agglomeration is viewed here as a matter of external economies of scale, the hypothesis being that 
the profitability of each firm can be higher if other firms are nearby and this could be due either to 
vertical linkages-i.e., it is advantageous to be near suppliers of intermediates and buyers of final 
goods-, or to horizontal linkages, such as direct knowledge spillovers between firms and indirect 
knowledge links through a common, local pool of skilled labour or specialised management, for 
instance
9. If this concentration effect occurs, it may impact negatively on the level of intrafirm trade, 
reducing the need of vertical/horizontal integration between related parties located in different 
countries.  
 
However, in the context of the spatial division of labour, if geographical concentration occurs 
in particular parts of the value added chain of multinational production, the relation of industrial 
agglomeration and the level of intrafirm trade may be positive.  For instance, if semi-finished products  
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and other kind of inputs are produced in local industrial networks and sent to other plants in other 
locations and agglomerations – (Scott and Storper, 1992). In this context, agglomeration economies 
will stimulate intrafirm trade of the vertical type. 
 
Finally, geographical distance should disincentive trade of related parties, not only by 
increasing risk and uncertainly but also on account of the fact that it can diminish market accessibility. 
 
 
4. THE EMPIRICAL MODELLING 
 
Taking support on the theoretical references above mentioned and also on the empirical 
evidence from several studies, it is possible to formulate some hypothesis on the impact of the 
determinant factors of intrafirm trade of US firms between 1989-98. 
 
As previously explained, our dataset confines the estimates to intrafirm trade between US 
parents and the MOFAs, thus excluding the trade between foreign MNCs and their affiliates in the US.  
 
Besides, we had to consider only the case of the manufacturing industry, which according to 
our data represents more than two thirds of intrafirm trade. A larger sample was not treatable due to 
missing data
10. This means that we excluded distributional activities and other services, including the 
case of the typical trade with an affiliate that engages in nothing but sales activity. 
 
Finally, our data do also preclude the possibility of separating the finished products relatively 
to the intermediate ones used in production. 
 
We will explore the industry and country characteristics associated with intrafirm trade but 
with distinct models. Alternatively we could have introduced simultaneously in the same equation both 
national and industry-specific variables. However, we are sceptic about the advantage of this doing 
when the observation for the industry (product) is the same for every country involved in each bilateral 
transaction. In fact, due to the data requirements, both home and foreign country conditions on  
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industry characteristics have to be proxied with just home-country conditions on the equivalent 
industry for every country involved in the bilateral trade. Of course, separate estimations do not 
overcome this shortcoming, but at least we do not have to explicitly attribute a value at the industry 
level for each bilateral transaction
11.  
 
The “industry model” 
 
In the “industry model” we considered 34 sectors and the following five hypotheses: 
 
H1.1. The propensity of an industry to intrafirm trade is positively related to the extent of 
vertical integration (VI) in that industry. 
 
H1.2. The propensity of an industry to intrafirm trade is positively related to the intensity of 
international production (IP) (as a pre-condition to intrafirm trade) of that industry. 
 
H1.3. The propensity of an industry to intrafirm trade is positively related to the technology 
intensity (TI) of that industry. 
 
H1.4. The propensity of an industry to intrafirm trade is positively related to the level of 
economies of scale (ES) in that industry.  
 
H1.5. The propensity of an industry to intrafirm trade is related to the level of US parent firm 
spatial (geographic) concentration (GC) on that industry. This variable aims to capture 
agglomeration economies and the expected sign is ambiguous, depending on whether 
the industry concentrated concerns only a part of the value added chain (for instance, 
intermediate inputs, traded with final products in the foreign market) or covers a 
significant part of the production process. In the former case, geographical concentration 
may stimulate intrafirm trade; in the latter, it will tend to produce low or even null levels of 
intrafirm trade (considering that the distribution activities are not included in our data).   
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Thus, five regressors compose the “industry model”:  
 
VIit, an indicator of the extent of vertical integration for industry i in t, is the ratio of value 
added in industry i to the industry i’s total sales during year t. We build the variable without profits in 
the numerator and denominator to get the “adjusted vertical integration index” of (Tucker and Wilder, 
1977). 
 
IPit,, the intensity of international production, is proxied by the simple average between year t-
1 and t of the ratio of total assets of US parents´ foreign affiliates in industry i over total assets of US 
parents in the same industry.  
 
TIit is an indicator of the technology intensity given by the ratio of Research & Development 
expenditure in industry i to the industry i's total sales during year t. 
 
ESit, is an indicator of the level of economies of scale of an industry proxied by the ratio of the 
average sales per firm in industry i to the average sales per firm in all industries. 
 
GCit is the Gini coefficient for industry i in year t. It was build considering five major regions in 
the US: New England, Mideast, Great Lakes, Plains, Southeast, Southwest, Rocky Mountains and 
Far West. 
 
Given these variables, the basic “industry model” is expressed as: 
 
IFTit= b b0 VIit+b b1 IPit + b b2 TIit +b b3 ESit + b b4 GCit + Eit
  (1) 
 (i=1, 2, .., 32; t=1,2, .., 10), 
 
where the dependent variable is an indicator of the propensity to intrafirm trade, that is, IFTit is the 
share of industry i intrafirm trade in the total sales
12 of industry i during year t. Eit stands for the 
disturbance term for the ith unit (industry) at time (year) t.   
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The “country model” 
 
In the “country model” we consider 36 countries and the following hypothesis: 
 
H2.1. The intrafirm trade between US and country j is positively related to the market size of 
trade partners (GDP). 
 
H2.2. The intrafirm trade between US and country j is negatively related to tax rate on profits 
in country j (PTR)
13. 
 
H2.3. The intrafirm trade between US and country j is related to the exchange rate (EXR) 
between US dollar and country j currency. A negative sign should be expected if we are 
considering the import flows but positive for the export side. Thus, if we take both flows, 
the expected sign is ambiguous.  
 
H2.4. The intrafirm trade between US and country j is negatively related to the distance 
between two nations (DIST). 
 
H2.5.The intrafirm trade between US and country j is negatively related to risk increase in 
country j (RISK). 
 
In order to control for the effect of risk on bilateral IFT, we added a proxy for risk constructed 
for each one of the countries of our sample with the Risk Country Index published every six months 
by the European Review. It was built as the difference between the value of the index for the US and 
for each one of the partner countries, lagged of one or more years. The expected impact of this 
variable on IFT is negative, because if the risk differential in the market of the US parents´ foreign 




Accordingly, the following regressors compose the “country model”: 
 
GDPjt, the product of the US Gross Product and the Gross National Product of country j in 
year t; PTR jt,, the tax rate on profits of country j at year t, which is proxied by the share of income 
taxes paid by MOFAs in their total income for country j during year t; EXRjt, the real exchange rate 
between US dollar and country j currency at year t; DISTjt, the distance between Chicago and major 
trading city in country j; DUMMIESj, the country dummies with value one for the country considered 
and zero otherwise; RISKj,t-1, the difference between risk in the US and in the foreign partner lagged 
of one (or more years). 
 
Considering the explanatory variables, the “country model” is expressed by the equation (2): 
 
IFT
jt= b b0 GDPjt +b b1 PTRjt +b b2 DISTj +b b3 EXRjt +b b4 DUMMIESj +b b5 RISKj,t-1 + 
+ Ejt                                                                                                                             
(2) 
 (i=1, 2, .., 36; t=1,2, .., 10) 
 
where IFTjt, is an indicator of intrafirm trade constructed in two different ways. First, we will use the 
total volume of intrafirm trade between US and country j at year t at 1993 constant (market) prices. In 
a second step, we will use, alternatively, the share of US bilateral intrafirm trade in total bilateral trade 
between US and country j in year t. The reason to consider the second measure is the fact that we 
should not depreciate intrafirm imports and exports with the import and export market price index, but 
with an index based on transfer prices, which, nonetheless, is not available.  
 
The second indicator is also however subject to criticism. In fact, on one hand, it allows to by-
pass the fact that an appropriate price level deflator is not available; but, on the other hand, being a 
measure for the propensity of the US to have intrafirm trade with country j, the level of intrafirm trade 
may be increasing while this ratio is decreasing, if a higher proportional increase is occurring in the 
total bilateral trade level.  
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The proxies were built using the IMF data for GDP, real exchange rate and price indexes for 
the 1989-1997 period. US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data is used for the other indicators. 
Distance is calculated between Chicago and the major city in the partner country. GDP and trade data 
are in constant 1993 prices using the GDP and the import/export price indexes published by IMF and 
US Labour Department, respectively. 
 
The various equations are estimated in terms of a panel sample. The fundamental advantage 
of a panel set over a cross section is that it will allow the researcher far greater flexibility in modelling 
differences in behaviour across individuals. In both models we tested the hypothesis that the constant 
terms are all equal with an F test. If the null hypothesis is accepted, the efficient estimator is pooled 
least squares. But if we accept the existence of fixed effects, the ordinary least squares still provides 
consistent and efficient estimates of the regressors provided that we include dummy variables for the 
specific effects. The t-statistics are corrected of heteroscedasticity with the White method. 
Examination of the correlation coefficients of the explanatory variables do not suggest 
multicollinearity. 
 
In the industry model, our dependent variable assumes values in the interval (0,1). The 
correctness of the functional form of the OLS regression in this case is questionable considering the 
possibility that the predicted value for the dependent variable may fall outside the feasible interval. 
However, following other authors who faced a similar problem, we opt for the OLS estimation for three 
reasons. First, it is not clear which alternative functional form should be used
14. Second,  this problem 
is less critical if the purpose is “hypothesis testing” , as it is the case, than if the equation is used for 
forecasting/prediction. Third, in the light of the data deficiencies and proxy problems encountered in 
such work, it is questionable whether to sophisticate the OLS method is merited, as also pointed out 
in the intra-industry trade literature (Greenway and Milner, 1986, p. 131).  
 
It is possible that some of the factors determining intrafirm trade impact differently according 
to whether we are considering exports or imports. We also estimated both models disentangling the 
dependent variable according to this distinction. In the country model the results are similar to the 
model with the intrafirm trade balance, suggesting that the same factors affect both sides. In the  
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industry model, we face serious data limitations and, perhaps on account of that, the explanatory 
power of the regression is very poor. 
  
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The “industry model” 
Results for the “industry model” are presented in see Table 8. The explanatory power of the 
model is high. The technological intensity and vertical integration coefficients are statistically 
significant with the expected sign. The economies of scale and international production variables are 
significant, the former with a positive sign and the latter with a negative one. These results are 
reasonable in economic terms if we consider that the economies of scale are a well known source of 
quasi rents and the world is more and more featured by the volatility of the installed firms.  
 
TABLE 8 




C  -0.07*** 
(-2.51) 
TI  0.896*** 
(77.293) 
ES  0.003** 
(2.276) 
VI  0.063** 
(2.494) 
IP  -0.0001*** 
(-3.109) 
GC  -0.007* 
(-1.856) 
R2  0.979 
R2 Adj.  0.961 
N  320 
F(a,b=ai, b)  1.238 
(H0 accepted 5%) 
t-statistics (between brackets) White-corrected 
***1% significance level 
**5% significance level 
*10% significance level 
 
The result for the degree of spatial concentration of parent firms appears to be negatively 
correlated with intrafirm trade. The reason for a negative correlation may be that parent firms in the  
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US, if they search for agglomeration economies and therefore geographically concentrate, tend to 
“clusterise” (in the sense of (Porter, 1990)), that is to say, spatial concentration of an industry 
concerns a significant part of the value added production process. Of course we can not exclude that 
intrafirm trade of these firms occurs in the distribution and other service activities not included in our 
data.  
 
There might exist industry individual effects, which are taken to be constant over time and 
specific to the individual cross-sectional unit. However, with the test F performed to the equality of 
these coefficients, the null is not rejected. 
 
 
The “country model” 
 
Table 9 shows the results for country model when the dependent variable is the total volume 
of intrafirm trade between US and country j (at constant prices). The explanatory power of the model 
is good (the adjusted R2 is 0.570). We confirm that the dimension of the markets impact, as 
measured by their GDP, positive and significant. Tax rate on profits displays the negative expected 
result.  
 
The exchange rate variable was not significant, what led us to exclude it from the results. The 
reason might be the fact that US parent firms envisage the external markets as basically stable in 
what concerns exchange rate variations. However, the most plausible reason is the fact that an 
opposite sign should be expected depending on whether we are considering the import flows 
(negative) or the export side (positive), the effect being cancelled when the trade balance is 
considered. 
 
The distance variable has the expected negative impact on intrafirm trade. 
 
We added two dummies to capture country idiosyncrasies. This was suggested, on one hand, 
by the above-mentioned F test to the equality of the coefficients. In fact, now the null is rejected. On  
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the other hand, the descriptive analysis of section 2 clearly suggests country asymmetries in bilateral 
intrafirm trade with US firms. We included dummies for the case of countries with trade agreements-
NAFTA and EU countries-, but only in the first case we get a significant result (and positive, as 
expected).
15 The fact that the EU variable is not significant can be related to the heterogeneity of the 
countries that belong to this block in terms of the phenomenon we are analysing (see Table 6). We 
also included a dummy for the UK case, to capture whether the particular historical, cultural and 
linguistic relations impact positively on the level of intrafirm trade, what in fact is statistically confirmed.  
 
Finally, we do not confirm the negative impact of the risk proxy. However, countervailing 
effects may be expected if we take into consideration that US parents will probably overprice exports 
and underprice imports in their intra-firm trade with MOFAs, in order to transfer profits from the 
country where risk, in relative terms, has increased, to the US parents; the expected decrease on 
intrafirm trade based on FDI considerations may thus be, at least in part, annihilated, in what 
concerns the intrafirm trade of exports or even of both flows (exports and imports).  
 
TABLE 9 




C  12.207*** 
(3.084) 
GDP  0.045*** 
(14.310) 
PTR  -72.7544*** 
(-3.709) 
DIST  -0.008** 
(-2.323) 






R2  0.574 
R2 Adj.  0.570 
N  340 
F (a,b=ai, b)  91.348 
(H0 rejected) 
t-Statistics (between brackets) White-corrected 
***1% significance level 
**5% significance level 
*10% significance level 
 
Table 9 displays only the estimation with the significant variables, considering that inclusion of 
the EU dummy and the risk variable, similarly to what occurs with the exchange rate variable, does 
not have remarkable effects on the remaining variables.   
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As we have previously explained, we also used, as an alternative to the dependent variable of 
table 9, the share of bilateral intrafirm trade in the bilateral trade. The explanatory power of the model 
however diminishes dramatically (the adjusted R2 is only 0.089). Criticism pointed out to this second 
measure may explain this disappointing result. 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper studies the evolution and determinants of US intrafirm trade between 1989-98 
reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the US Department of Commerce.  
 
In what concerns the main characteristics of US intrafirm trade, it is worthwhile mentioning 
that Japan is the country with the highest values for bilateral intrafirm trade with US in the total US 
bilateral trade, followed by the EU and Canada, and these three partners also represent the highest 
shares of total US intrafirm trade. However, when we consider only intrafirm trade of MOFAs (thus 
excluding intrafirm trade managed by US affiliates of foreign parent firms), the prevalent role of Japan 
drops dramatically and the values for the EU decreases to half, thus pointing out to the relevant role 
of US affiliates on intrafirm trade of these countries. Considering MOFAs only, the weight of the 
manufacturing industry in the total US intrafirm trade increases from an average of 50% to around 
70%, suggesting that intrafirm trade between foreign parent firms and their affiliates includes a 
substantial amount of wholesale intrafirm trade.  
 
Our attempt to explain the determinant factors of the US intrafirm trade was conditioned by 
the quality of the data. In fact, our figures have some obvious limitations and suggest some prudence 
for general conclusions. First of all they concern only MOFAs, excluding from our sample the intrafirm 
trade conducted by US affiliates of foreign parent firms. Second, they do not allow to distinguish trade 
of finished goods from trade on intermediate products. Third, they concern only manufacturing 
activities, thus excluding sales and after-sales activities, even if they represent only an unilateral flow 
(imports or exports) of intrafirm trade. Fourth, some apparently relevant factors could not be tested 
due to lack of data (such as excess capacity and other host governments’ policies). Finally, work with  
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data at the firm level would be relevant as firms can be highly heterogeneous in a given sector. In 
spite of these shortcomings, the empirical results of both the model to explain inter-sectoral variation 
and the model for inter-country differences appear to be in general interesting and work well in terms 
of their explanatory power.  
 
Summarising our statistical results, the factors that affect the US intrafirm trade managed by 
MOFAS are technology intensity, the level of vertical integration, economies of scale, the level of 
international production, as well as the impact of the geographic concentration of US parent firms. 
The fact that location considerations related to agglomeration economies appear to impact negatively 
on intrafirm trade, is not surprising. It is reasonable to assume that industries that search for 
agglomeration economies tend to geographically concentrate a significant part of the value added 
production process. This does not mean that the spatially concentrated industries do not transact on 
related parties. If we take into consideration that wholesale trade and services are excluded from our 
data, it is possible that “clusterised” industries engage on related party trade in sales and after sales 
activities. In any case, this is a subject for further research.  
 
At the country level we also identified some relevant factors. The size of the market appears 
to favour intrafirm trade while the level of the tax rate on profits of the foreign country disincentives 
this trade. As expected, country specificities appear to impact positively in some cases, such as being 
member of the NAFTA or displaying cultural affinities, like in the UK case. Finally, US parents prefer 
to transact internally with less distant countries, as expected. 
 
As regards specification, some further points can be raised. First, more theory before 
pursuing the empirical work would be most valuable. There is still a long theoretical path to run to 
prove the relation between intrafirm trade and factors related to characteristics of the foreign markets 
internalised, such as the sensitivity of trade to exchange rate variations, the role of transfer pricing 
and restrictive business practices, or the role of geographical factors. Second, a most relevant 
question seems to be not whether intrafirm trade occurs more or less in an industry or a country but 
rather if it behaves differently from trade between unrelated parties, as pointed out by Helleiner since  
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his seminal paper of 1979. Third, much more detailed data should be provided in order to allow new 
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Footnotes 
                                                        
1 Jetro is the Institution responsible for this kind of statistics.  
 
2 See Lall (1978), who represents one of the first systematic attempt to explain interindustry differences in the US 
intrafirm exports, and Helleigner and Lavergne (1979), who explained interindustry differences in the US intrafirm 
imports. 
 
3 A “foreign affiliate of a US parent firm” is defined by the US Department of Commerce as a foreign business 
enterprise in which a US person owns or controls 10 percent or more of the voting securities or the equivalent. 
 
4 According to US Department of Commerce, a “US affiliate of a foreign parent firm” is a US business enterprise 
in which a single foreign person owns or controls, directly or indirectly, 10 percent or more of the voting securities 
or equivalent. 
 
5 According to the Department of Commerce, this concept includes all foreign affiliates in which the direct and 
indirect ownership interest of all US parents exceeds 50 percent. 
 
6 Data will be supplied on request. 
 
7 See Lall (1978) for this distinction.  
 
8Preliminary evidence of this possibility is supported by Barrell and Pain (1999) on the concentration of the stock 
of US manufacturing FDI in Europe.  
 
9See, on this purpose, Flôres et al (2000), p. 22 and following.  
 
10 In the non-manufacturing industry, we have several “missing values” due to protection of information.  
 
11 See a similar argumentation but for the case of an intra-industry model, in Crespo and Fontoura (2001).  
 
12 It was not possible to use total trade due to the missing values of the dataset in the case of some sectors.  
 
13 The tax rate is the foreign income tax paid by affiliates in a given country relative to their net (before tax) 
income. 
 
14 We tested for an alternative functional form which restricts the predicted value to the limited range: 
the logistic function, estimated with non-linear least squares. Similarly to the OLS model, we verify a 
positive impact of technology intensity and the level of vertical integration.    
 
15 We also run a least squares dummy variable model, with a dummy variable for each country, but this grouping 
significantly increases the explanatory capacity of the model. 